In-ho~se . development of scheduling decision support systems:

case ~t~d.Y for scheduling semiconductor device test operations
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Most manufacturing processes can benefit from an automated scheduling system.
However;: the design of a fast, computerised scheduling system that achieves
high-quality results and requires minimal resources is a difficult undertaking.
Efficient .. scheduling of a semiconductor device test facility requires an
information system that provides good schedules quickly. Semiconductor device
testing- is the last stage of the long semiconductor manufacturing process, and
therefore. is subjected to customer service pressures. The cost of an off-the-shelf
computerised scheduling system may he prohibitive for many companies.
In addition, many companies are taken aback by other characteristics of
ofT-the~shelf scheduling systems, such as code confidentiality, maintenance costs,
and failure rates. We draw upon the literature and our field case to discuss some
of the"trade-offs bet\',:een in-house development and off-the-shelf acquisition of
software: We describe the in-house design and implementation of a scheduling
decision :support system for one device test facility. Using lh~.: design and
implementation process of this system as a case study, we discuss how one facility
uses in-h~mse design of systems in a strategic way, as a competiliv~ l:apability.
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1. Introduction
Many manufacturing processes may benefit from an automated scheduling system.
However, the, design of a fast, computerised scheduling system that achieves
high-quality results and requires minimal resources is a difficult undertaking.
The cost of an 'off-the-shelf' computerised scheduling system may be prohibitive
for many companies. In addition, in our experience many companies are taken aback
by other characteristics of off-the-shelf scheduling systems, such as code
confidentiality; maintenance costs, and failure rates. We will use the term 'off-the
shelf throughout this article to refer to software that is purchased from a
vendor, with the understanding that the user-interface, and to some limited extent
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we further explore the potentia l benefits of m-ho usc destgn of sc h~..:dulmg systt.:nb lot
sma ll to medium·size companies.
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The dcsion and developmen t of the in·l10use system was completed 111 _tour
months by a ~hree-person team, all full-time l:ompany crnployccs. The team con ststcd
of two industrial engineers and a process expert (past production manage r~ ·- Sys_tcm
implementation was completed in three month s. Up~radcs and mo~iJI tcattons
requested by production m a n agement and worker·s contmucd to he performed hy
one of the industrial engineers, who devoted approximately one da y a week to
the task .
Shortly after implementation of the in·h ouse system, on- time dcliv..:ry (the main
manufacturing performance measure for the test facil ity) inc reased from 7 0'/~) to
90% on average. Lot lead-times decreased by approximate ly 30<Yo . While this was
not a controlled experiment, to our knowledge there were no other major changes
in production or demand that would have explained this improveme nt. As detailed
below, time and effort to create a daily schedule and to re-schedule the test facility
\vere reduced significantly.
The system had approximately 40 u sers, including both direct users and managers
reviewing the schedule with various levels of education and process expertise.
In order to accommodate the needs and computer skill levels of the various users,
specia l efforts were made b y the developers to des ign a ' tra nsparent' , u ser- fri end ly
system . While no systematic d a ta were gathered on u ser percept ions of tran spa rency
or case- of-use, existing relationships between the developers and users o f the system
facilitated open communications about usability is sues: hy the end of the
implementation process, there were n o outstanding issues o r user reque sts related
to usability.
In-house development a nd execution had significant impact on organisational
learning. In particular, using the system contributed to the organisa ti o nal under
stand ing of capacity issues a nu sch eduling tradeoffs. The reports ge nerated hy the
~ystem led to the identification o f problem areas, and to focused process
Improvement efforts. The lon~er-term production planning process also benefitted
from the mor~ a~curalc capactty estimates provided b y the system .
The orgamsatton that owned o ur field site, Xilinx Inc., is a firm tha t ha s a culture
which has supp~rted in-house development of operations software, as a co mpetiti ve
technology.. While other ~rms, ~specially hefore the 'tech bubble' hurst , invested
large sums m off-the-shelf pla nnmg and scheduling a nd supply ct . ·
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customised a unique- competitive solution for forecasting. Beyond the rhetoric of
vision and goals, iiwcstments must he made to support operational capabilities a
ftrm wishes to develop for strategic advantage (Stalk et al. 1992). Xilinx invests in
technically qualified personnel who can understand both software development, ami
the manufacturing processes involved. Three of the Xilinx employees involved in the
soft\varc projects just outlined held PhDs (two with degrees in Industrial Engineering
from Berkeley, one· with a degree in Information Systems from Stanford). While
advanced technical degrees may be common in research and development of firms
such as Xilinx (which is, after all, a technology company), in our experience it is less
common to find advanced technical degrees in the planning and manufacturing
organisations.
Semiconductor device testing is the last stage of the semiconductor manufactur
ing process. At the Xilinx test Boor in San Jose, California, dozens of lots of
semiconductor devices arc processed daily. Due to the level of competitiveness in this
industry, efficient i1~d timely processing is crucial to the company's success. Before
the system was implemented. the main test-floor performance measure, lot on-time
delivery (fraction of lots completed by their due-date), was unacceptable- 75°/o on
average. In addition, lot lead-times were prohibitively long.
Historically, lot 'scheduling had been performed by the production manager.
Due to the overwhelming volume of lot information and the level of uncertainty
inherent to this m.:inufacturing environment, the scheduling task typically consumed
more than half of-the production manager's time. The production manager was
required to work seven days a week, since no one else was capable of developing a
daily schedule.
··
Developing a better scheduling methodology for the test-floor \vas nece:::;sary.
The main challenges of the new system were to increase average on-time delivery to
90% and to decre.:ise average lot lead-time by at least 25%. The system had to he
user friendly to people with limited computer experience (e.g. test-floor supervisors
and workers), and provide solutions fast (\vithin minutes). so that a new schedule
could be easily created when conditions changed (e.g. machine breakdown).
After reviewing several commercial scheduling packages, a decision was made to
develop the system in-house. A team of three full-time company employees
(including the p~oduction manager/scheduler), designed and implemented the
scheduling decisio; support system.
The method applied in this paper is that of a case study, in its typical role of
theory building (Lee 1999). However, we will not build a grand theory broadly
addressing the question of software outsourcing. Rather, we will present a unique
case that raises theoretical questions about what has been, to our mind, the
overwhelming recent trend toward outsourcing software solutions. The first and
third authors of :this paper helped conduct the reported review of commercial
scheduling packages, and formed the core of the development team for the in-house
solution. The second author worked for one of the commercial scheduling vendors
being evaluated. Thus, this paper is not written in the typical logical positivi_st frame
?f reference, but is rather written in an interpretivist frame, hy actors Involved
ln the event, who ' are candidly advocates of the solution that was obtained. As
~uch, it is conducted in the spirit of action research (Lev·.rin 1946) and app~eciative
lnquiry. We belic~·c it has value for managers and researchers outstde our
organisations because it provides (we hope) a vivid and thoughtful counter-example
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2. Process characteristics
Th e sem iconductor device test sub-process receives high visibility since it is th~: last
stage of the semiconductor manufacturin g process. From the test facility dc,·iccs arc
shipped to customers and distribution centers, or transferred to linishcd goods
inventory. A typical test-floor includes severa l processing operations: burn-in.
electrical testing, marking/ branding, baking, programming, mechanical scanning.
quality check and packaging, in this order (see figure I).
The lesl-Ooor can be described as a flexible now-shop, i.e. the scqm: n c~ of
processing operations is fixed, each lot req uires a unique subset of the ope rations
(burn-in, marking, baking, and programming may or may not be required). anJ
multiple machines may be eligible for each operation. Since these mach ines may not
be identical with respect to processing rates and/or output qualit y. there may h~ lot
assignment preferences among the set of eligible machin es for an operation (S.:c
Leachman and Carmon (Freed) 1992 for further discussion on machine llcxibilitv).
Yield and lead-time variability in previous stages of the manufacturing pnK~ss
(i.e., wafer fabrication and assembly- see figure 2) result in variable Jot sizes and lot
priorities at the test sub-process. Yield loss at the test and scan opera tions may also
be s ignificant and affect lot size and processing time at downstream operations.
Lot priorities range from low priority lots to ' hot' lots that may justify pre-~mption
of other lots.
. ~achine failures are common a nd unpredictable . Preventive maint c nan c~ is
st~mfica_nt, but cannot elimina te frequent breakdowns. Machines arc more likdv to
fail dunng a changeover from one type of lot to a signilicantly different ;1nc.
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Changeover durations are significant (same order of magnitude as lot processing
durations), variable and sequence-dependent. For further discussion of the
complexity of scheduling semiconductor device test operations the reader is referred
to Uzsoy eta/. (1992a; 1994). to Carmon (Freed)(l995), and to Freed and Leachman
(2001).
Test-floor workers have various ski ll levels and skill sets. Some workers can
operate subsets of the machines, and others can operate all machines hut sub sets of
product types. Labour cost is s ubstanti a l (due to training time anti cost, as well as·
skilled labour shortage), thus skilled labour capacity constrains throughput.
A worker may be assigned to operate two or more machines, therefore lost capacity
due to machine interference is common.

3. Performance goals
Asemiconductor company would typically hold a la rge buffer inventory (Die Bank)
between the wafer fabrication s ub-process (front-end) and the assembly and test
sub-process (back-end), in an attempt to absorb production fluct uations in the
front-end and faciiitate produce-to-order in the back-end (sec fi gure 2).
When transferred from Die Bank into the beginning of its assembly and test
sub-process, each lot is assigned a due-date. By the due date the lot should complete
the manufacturing process and either be shipped to its customer/distribution centre
or transferred into finished goods inventory (FGI). The d uc date is determined based
on the allowed assembly and test flow-time (also called lead-time or cycle-lime) for
the lot. It is common practice to set the due-dates such that 95% of the lots are
expected to achieve the goal of on-time delivery. In an effort to continuously
improve, allowed . flow-times are decreased once the 95% OTD goal has been
achieved.
The test facility is typically concerned with three goals:

1. Maximising on-time delivery (OTD), measured as the fraction of lots shipped
or transferred to FGT before midnight of their due-date (maximising OTD is
practically equivalent to minimi sing the number of tardy lots).
2. Minimising cycle-time, measured as the number of days from the beginning of
the assembly process to shipping or transfer to FGI.
3. Maximising tester utilisatio n, since the testers are the most capital-intensive
machines and the process' typical bottleneck.
The OTD performance of make-to-order lots is important for customer
satisfaction. Maximising OTD of make-to-stock lots is partially overlapping with
minimising the mean and variance of the cycle-time, which, in turn can lead to
increased sales and inventory reduction. The equipment utilisation performance
measure is a'n indirect measu re of facility throughput and manufacturing cost.
Due to dynamic changes in market conditions, c ustomer requirements, corporate
financial goals, . and other business objectives cont1icts among performance
measures are common (e.g. OTD versus utilisation) and must be balanced. The
scheduling system must be flexible enough to accommoda te multiple, time-varying
objectives.

4. Scheduling methods in the semiconductor industry
Some semiconductor companies u sc scheduling modules that ar~ part of their
manufacturing execution system (MES). Other firms usc commerciaL stand-~1 lone
sch eduling systems. Yet others u se software written in-hou ~e; and as m~nttoncd
earlier the authors have also seen firms where the production manager or other
highly ,qualifi ed personnel perform the scheduling tc.~sk manually. For:_tcst sched_ulin g
solution techniques the reader is referred to the senes of papers by Carmon (l · rccd)
(1995), Chen et a!. (1995), H errmann et al. (1995), Lee et al. ( 1993), Uzsoy ct a/.
(1993), Ovacik and Uzsoy (1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996), and to the pap~rs by
Uzsoy et al. (1991), Uzsoy et al. (1992b), Chen and Hsia (1997), Dcmirkol and Uzsoy
(1997), Xiong and Zhou (1998) and Freed and Leachman (200 I) .
There are substantial differe nces in process characteristics among semiconductor
manufacturers. For example, some compa nies test only at room tempera t urc. while
others must track temperatures and environmental conditions. T herefore. comma
cially available scheduling systems h ave generic functionality that is greater than the
need s of any specific application. Generic systems a lso requi re signilirant
customisation to each application. Due to the inherent complexity of the process,
scheduling solutions are typically achieved using heuristic alg orithms or s imulation.
Based on the software survey conducted as a part of this study (summaris~d hl..'iow).
and based on the experience of the second author (\vho was employed h y a major
scheduling software vendor a t the time of this study), a typical scheduling system or
module for a semiconductor company costs hundreds of thousands of doll ars
upfront, and a substantia l ad dition al cost for customisation. Over the life of a
scheduling system maintena nce costs are of similar order of mal!nit ude. Most
vendo rs would not release the code to their customers, so cust;misa lion anc.l
maintenance must typically be contracted to the original system vendor. who thus has
a potential conflict of interest in terms or developing robust, easy-to-maintain code.

5. Make-or-buy decision
The fa~tors used to e~aluate the make or buy decision at Xilinx arc grouped into
ca tegones and ~hown ~n table 1. The categories are explained in mo re ~lctail hdow.
and the evaluat1on of m-house versus off-the-shelf software is di~cusscd in terms of
each factor.
Obviously, the factors listed in table 1 ·
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Factors affecting the make or buy decision.

I. Operational _cfficicncy and effectiveness
1.1 Source code availability
l.l.a Timeliness of modifications
1.1.b Control of logic/ algorithms (compditivc consideration)

1.2 Integration with other systems
2. Organisation<il learning
2.1 Gained expertise of process now and complexities
2.2 Likelihood of yielding process improvements
2.3 Likeli,h_c)Qd of spurring development of other innovative systems
3. Cost , .--.
3.1 Developmcnt;acquisition
3.2 lmple.mcntation
3.3 Present value of annual maintenance

managers believe : that in-house systems lead to superior process performance
compared to ofT-the-shelf systems (Downing et al. 2003). In the case of scheduling
systems, this may ~ · be because the level of customisation required of a generic
scheduling system · is very high if the system is to be accurate enough to provide
reasonable solutions. In fact, the customisation effort in this case was estimated to be
similar to designing a completely customised system, tailored to the Xilinx test-floor
needs.
·
Most commercial scheduling systems provide solutions to the scheduling
problem, and are · not designed as decision support systems. In our experience,
vendors arc reluctant to release information about the algorithms used, and the
quality of a scheduling solution provided by software may sometimes be inferior to
that of a manual solution provided by the company's scheduling expert. Take, for
example, a case of scheduling a particular customer order knowing that a previous
order for this customer was delayed. The importance of on time delivery for this
particular custo.m er order may be higher than normal. However, special treatment of
this particular order is impossible to ]ncorporatc in any of the solution algorithms we
examined. Some ·or the software providers incorporate sophisticated user interfaces
to facilitate after-the-fact modificatio ns of solutions to allow users to account for
such unmodelled considerations (Schneeweiss and Wetterauer 2005 ). But after-the
fact modifications, ':however good the user interface, are not the same as building
solutions in a flexible, interactive way. The second author remembers saying in a
wondering tone at one meeting: 'You expect people to pay $400,000 so that they can
tell you what their. schedule should be?'
There is a range of applications here, from simple closed-Loop presentation of
a canned solution :.which cannot b e modified, through dynamic algorithms that
~an account for· changing situations within a limited modelling framework, to fully
Interactive support systems which provide recommendations, along with a
transparent set of-reasoning, and allow for modification and interaction as the
schedule is being built (Godin 1978, McKay et a/. 1988, Glassy 1991). While after
the-fact modification is an improvement on the flexibility of batch scheduling, it is
still short of fully interactive scheduling. Since the algorithms are not understood and
cannot be improved•by the users, it may be difficult for users to understand how to
modify them after the fact.
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of the 'high-end' scheduling software we evaluated allow the mput of pnon\y w~1g ~ts
to optimisation criteria (e.g. tardiness, minimising setups). The tran_sparcncy ol a_
system is known to influence the degree to which a human sche.dukr l~e~s a sense ol
direct controL and is seen as a key design factor of schcdulmg <.kctsiOn support
systems (Wier~ 1997, 2001). Allowing users to input priority weights m.a y bc .tlwught
to provide some sense of control without transparency. But as the wa~ 111 wh1ch_ these
weights are applied is opaque (sometimes to the employees ()!. the St)l_twar~_
company), such adjustments have little more value than the psychologtcal comfort nl
'doing something' to try to guide the expensive software to a less na"ivc solution: and
that psychological comfort may be quickly lost if the new schedules the softwar~

proposes are not in fact better.
Xilinx considered its scheduling system to be a potentia\ smm.:e nf cnmpetiti\'e
advantage, and hence the make-or-buy decision needed to rclkct strategic as well as
tactical implications. Firms such as Wal*ma rt (cross-docking). Fed-Ex (in-transit
visibility) and SCNF (scheduling; Be n-Khedher ct a/. 199X) han~ demonstrated
how software can be used to support strategic business process capa bilitit:s. J\n
off-the-shelf scheduling solution, available to any competitor might not put Xilinx al
a competitive disadvantage, but would forego an opportunity to create a proprietary
competitive advantage through improved scheduling.
In a survey of several manufacturing organisations facing makc-or-huy d~<.:isions.
Buchowicz (1991) found that firms which couched the makc-or-huv decision 111
strategic, competitive terms tended to develop in-house. while firms tl~at purchased
off-the-shelf software tended to be dominated by professional values. and to be more
concerned with peer approval and the need to have a 'pseudo-rational' justification.
\Vhile there are undoubtedly circumstances where the competitive adv.anta!.!CS that
mi~ht b e ~btained from in-house development are outweighed by the polcn;ial cost
savmgs ot an off-the-~helf acquisition, we do not believe that those competitive
advantages should be tgnored.
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the relative base rates (that is, relative turnover between Xilinx and the software
vendors) were a so"urce of concern and a decision factor.
Thus, we felt' that on the criteria of operational efficiency and effectiveness,
in tenns of timeliness of modificati ons a nd control of the logic and algorithms, an
in-house development was superior. While integration with some fut ure off-the-shelf
enterprise system was a concern, at tha t time Xilinx was also pursuing an 'open
architecture' data-bus solution for e nterprise system inter-operability, and we felt
that a schcduling·system developed in-house would be just as easily integra ted into
that architecture as an off-the-shelf system .
....-;:-.

7. Organisation,al learning
Although it may seem that the trend in software is heavily toward outsourcing and
inter-organisatiorial·,rclationships to foster learning (Holmqvist 2004), and that an
acquisition of outside experience in the form of software might foster better learning
outcomes, the reality, of organisalional lea rning is more complex. lt may also seem
that internal projects would be an exploitation of resources, whi le external
acquisitions would 'be an explora tion o f new potential. However, the reality appears
to be that the t\vo -kinds of learning (organisational and inter-organisational) are
interwoven, and that exploratory learning happens with in ternal projects as well
(Holmqvist 2004)::, Much of the experience in scheduling software is coded into
algorithms, which ·.vendors often claim as proprietary information. While there is
undoubtedly learning to be gained by the elaboration of business processes needed to
implement a scheduling software package, much of that learning may occur whether
an organisation is ·implementi n g off-the-shelf or in-house software. Some of the
business process learning in an off-the-shelf implementatio n nows fro m the customer
to the vendor. Of course, the argument can be made (by software vendors) that they
have exposure to a broad ran ge of firms in roughly the same line of business, and
that they can bring knowledge of 'best practice' to their clients. While we h ave
no data to argue-this point ei the r way, we would like to point out that the fact that
a software fi rm ' may have acq uired knowledge of b est practice of the industry
~rom ;other finns'. tends to support o ur point that the knowledge transfer can be
tn the other direction.
Hence, some firms maintain an in-house capability for software development at
least in part because of considerations of organisational learning. Chrysler, for
example, considers, software projects an essential part of its 'knowledge factory'
(Landes et a/. 1999); and while organisational learning is only one part of good
knowledge management, it is a necessary part.
The kinds of learning that can take place in such development projects have been
categorised as either model-building, or model-maintenance learning (Zhong a nd
~fajchrzak 2004). Model-building learning is clearly the more important, as it
~nvolves adaptin'g" to new knowledge. a nd building new conceptual structures that are
unportant in generating further process innovations out of a d evelopment project.
Some amount of model-building learning can take place in the customisation of an
otT-the-shelf system~ However, the kind of in-depth discussion or cog nitive
elaboration (Zhong and Majchrzak 2004) of algorithm~ and proees.scs ~ce?ed to
foster model-building knowledge from an off-the-shelf lmplem L:nta twn ts ta r less
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the client's processes (which might require a useful cogmttvc claho~at1on _1 rom the
customer) but simply to satisfy the customer that the system ·works as qutckly and
cheaply as possible.
.
,..
The pool of industrial engineering and process cxperttsc at ~lin:x was alsn. an
important factor \vhen considering the relative impact on or~amsatwnal karnmg.
Learning is the acquisition of knowledge; and knowledge. hkc wealth. may best
accrue to those that already have an existing fund and facility to mak~ usc of it.
There is evidem:c that firms with extensive existing knO\vlcdge in the problem donmn
more readily undertake software process innovations within that domain. and the
learning that result from them (Fichman and Kemerer 1997).
Finally, as \Ve will discuss in more detail in the next section on cost. many oil-the
shelf packages contain implicit assumptions about business processes that arc
different from the ones a company currently follows, and hence have information
requirements and outputs that do not at first appear to he within the limited scope of
the system requirements that first prompted a firm to seck a software solution. In the
case of enterprise resource planning software, it is common to hear that a firm must
adapt its business practices to suit those of the softwan.: (Austin e/ a/. 1999). This is
often defended as a benefit, because 'best practices' business process assumptions arc
imbedded in the software. Hence, modifying the finn's business proccses is seen as a
form of organisational learning. Ironically, however, studies of software l'irms
indicate that they themselves arc reluctant to adopt software that requires a process
innovation, at least in part because of the recognition that existing business proc~sscs
reflect_ strategic, competitive priorities and that a change in those processes may
necessttate a change in competitive strategy (Rifkin 2001 ).
In sum, \-Ve decided that one of the most important benefits of an in-house
dcvelo~ment at Xilinx would be the expert knowledge that would be spread among
the dcs1gn team memhers, as well as the user group. We hoped that this expertise
·
·
t
.would
. . . later benefit the com11any by be·mg ·mcorporatc d mto
process 1mprovemcn
mthatlVes and development of other computense
· d systems, smcc
·
·
the dcsu!n team
members were company en1ployees
~ as a11
_
· I n I-etrospect, t h'1s proved to he the case.
hut one of the er~ployees mvolved with this effort were still employed hv XilinX
five years after It started and th • h d
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.
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8. Cost
We note at the outset of our cost com
.
,
evaluating all had many capab·l·t·
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might seck to somehow value that t f
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x reqUirements, and that w
Xilinx' shop floor might 'gro\v int~~ ~~e unctt~nahty, against the possibility that
requirement. However. as Thelen <t110

Morrison (1993) pointed out. these add itional features also add cost. Those authors
evaluated nine off-the-shelf software packages for job-shop schedu ling, and fou nd
that none were as good as an in-house system, primarily because of the supcrilou s
features offered, and the cost of gathering and maintaining the superfluous
information needed to run them.
Cost comparison of vendor versus in-house development of a scheduling system
can be divided into the three phases of the project, namely design. implementation
and maintenance.
The design of a scheduling system requires industrial engineering/ope ra tions
research (lEfOR, hereafter) expertise, programming expertise, and process experti se.
Process expertise ·can typically be found in the form of one or more senior/long-term
company employees. The time and dedication (and, therefore, cost) of these
employees are necessary in the design and implementation phases, regardless of
whether the system is developed in-house or acquired off-the-shelf (and customised).
While in our evaluations, the e stimated time required from process experts varied
considerably depending on the vendor, the time estimates were not significantly
lower for ofT-thc~shclfimplcmentations, and indeed were sometimes higher. But it is
important to note that the tradeoff here is between time spent sharing knowledge
with another empi?y~c . (and hence distributing corporate knuwledg~ vvithin the
organisation) and time spent sharing knowledge outside the organisation. (Of course,
when a firm lacks st~te-of-thc-art process expertise, knowledge may transfer from the
vendor to the process experts as we1l, but at least in the case of Xilinx and the
vendors in question~ the process knowledge transfer from the vendor to the company
was deemed to be negligible.) The cost of lE/OR and programming expertise is
substantial in both cases. A company must compare the cost of acquiring the
expertise in the forin of employing the necessary personnel, to the cost of purchasing
the expertise from·:·~l ~cndor. Of course, in some firms, the relative scarcity of the
1
labour in question (programming and/ or process experti se) might drive the decision
to outsource, beyond a simple labour cost calculation.
For the development of our in-house system, the project leader had a doctorate
in industrial engineering and programming expertise. Another induslrial e n gineer
with similar backgro~nd was added, and the process expert who completed the
team had programming expertise as well. We felt that a significa nt amount of
time would be required from this team whether the development was in-house,
or off-the-shelf. While certainly some design time would be eliminated by using
an off-the-shelf system, our sen se was that the time required to get our team at
Xilinx fully up to..speed on the off-the-shelf designs would be approximately the
~arne (depending on the vendor) as the time required to gather specifications for an
m-housc developm~nt, since our team at Xilinx already had a great deal
of familiarity with the process. In our cost comparisons (see table 2) we thus
only included the incremental time tha t would be required to actually program the
in-house system. .
The availability of process expe rtise is crucial for implementation and
maintenance in' such projects. In thi s case th e process was best known to the
?roduction manager, who had been providing the schedules to t~e test-floor he w~s
In c_harge of for several years. This expert's co-operation w~s mvaluable, a nd hts
dedication was a necessary condition to designing the system m~house. \Ve felt that
the amount of his time that would be required for implementatiOn would probably

Table 2.

Cost compariso n, 2005 d oll ars.
In-house

Development

s tag~

Implementatio n
~aintenance

Annual
PV (5 years, 10%)
Lifecycle cost

$64 200
$72 300

$ 16 100
$61000
S l 97 500

Average off-thc- sh..:l f
(lo\v. : l\nagc. hi gh)
(S205 000. S32 1 20ll. S..\OlH)(lO)

(S 145 000. S2..t0 900. S -'~5000)
($ 14 000.

S-Hi .:::!00.

$ (J)

OllO)

SI X2 700
S7..t..t XOO

be less with an in-house development, as the development team wol_tld at least hcur
to speed on the basics of the p roductio n process, and much ~)I the _Jxnducuon
terminology used by Xilinx. To be conserva tive, howev~r, we dtd n~H ttH::_Iu dc the
additio nal cost of the production manager's time in the tmplcmcntatton ol t he niT
the-shelf system. The implementatjon cost for the off-the shelf system s repr~sc nt ~ an

average estimate from vendors and related consulting groups. Th~ tn -housc
implementation cost was calculated from the fully-burden ed salary o l the ot_hcr
two team memhers (not the prod uction manage r) and an est im ate of the tnnc
required to train users.
The m aintenance costs of the system, as a percentage of the acq ui sition cost
seem ed very attractive from the off-the-shelf vendors, but we did not think that
percentage represented a fair estimate of Xilinx maintenance costs. The nat
percentage ignored the time organic personnel would need to unde rs tand the
maintenance issue, codify it, and find a work around until the system could he li xcd
or enhanced. M oreover, while some of the softwa re vendor's mai ntcna nee lahou r
might be spread across multiple customers (and hence be less than the la bou r
required for an in-house development), most of tha t was o nly programming time. As
all but one of the vendors we spoke to seemed to have relatively small custome r hascs
(even software firms with relatively high visibility had fewer than a doze n worki ng
implementations), we were also unsure of the degree to whi L:h thei r economics of
scale would outweigh the m arkup they would necessarily expect to receive o n their
programmers' time. We felt that the fixed-percentage maintenance cont rac t merelY
obscured these underlying econo mics, as in the short run the sofhvarc ve ndor would
have the optio n of lowering their service costs in some way (delayed or degraded
service) if maintenance expectations outstripped the nominal fcc. In the e nd, we
decided tha t most of the o rganic cost required for maintena nce (analysis and
workaround) would he similar regardless of where the software was develo ped, and
included only the t!m: we t~ought represented a reasonable level of p r ogramming
support and analysts tor an m-house solution.
Five software vendors were evaluated for potential solution q uality, com panY
reliability and e_xpertise. Wha t is sh own in table 2 is a n average, high a nd low of
those costs. \Vh1le so~e vendors had lower costs, the average is a good indicati o n of
the tra deoff between tn-house development and off-the-shelf acquisition.

Finally, we recognised that our in-house estimates for development and
maintenance were more subjective. and more variable than the price quotes offered
by vendors. We also realised that implementation expense, whether off-the-shelf or
in-house, might vary substantially from the estimates. In such circumstances, a risk
analysis, using Monte-Carlo .simulation to gauge the probability that in-house costs
might exceed off-the-shelf costs can he useful. Ho\vcvcr, given the magnitude of the
cost differences between the alternatives, and the fact that in-house development
seemed superior on all of the qualitative facLors, we did not feel that a risk analysis
was necessary.
In the end, it was estimated that a decision-support system (DSS) tailored to
Xilinx' specific application would be simpler, faster, more effective and less expensive
than a generic, solution-providing system supplied by a vendor.
As noted above, one day per week was hudgeted for ongoing support of this
system, and that proved sufficient (as judged by lack of user complaints about
response to support requests). While someone had to wear a beeper to be on-call for
support, coverage across shifts also appeared to be adequate (again, based on lack of
complaints). Detailed data were not kept on maintenance costs, but the initial
estimate was used to derive the budgeted time for maintenance, and that budget was
not changed in four years after the implementation of the system.

9. Technical description of the system developed in-house

The system developed in-house was called The Dispatcher. It was designed to be
a user-friendly DSS. not a solution-providing, closed-loop (i.e. non-interactive)
scheduling system.
The main requirements from the system \Vere as follows:
• Determine and display lot processing requirements and urgency.
• Provide an efficient v,:ay to assign lots to resources and to sequence them for
each resource.
• Provide an erticient way to re-schedule in the event of machine breakdown.
• Provide sorting mechanisms for various performance measures.
• Provide and maintain process modeling accuracy and data accuracy.
• Provide data to user rapidly (run in less than five minutes).
The Dispatcher is an Excel-VBA-based decision support system. The main
advantages of using Excel are the familiarity of most users with it, and the ease of
data manipulation. It is meant to be used in an interactive fashion, displaying data
inputs to a decision· in an effective way, and giving prompt feedback ahout the
~ttality of proposed decisions. The human decision maker remains a central part of
Implementation, but the need for expert scheduler knowledge is reduced, as some of
the expert knowledge is built into the system (McKay and Wiers 2004).
Using macros, cell calculations, and Visual Basic code, The Dispatcher takes the
current WIP data and sorts it based on due-date and processing requirements.
The system gcner~tes a separate priority list for each of the five main test-floor
Processing steps, namely Test, Mark, Bake, Scan, and Visual Inspection. The
scheduler then makes the assignment (to one of several similar or identical resources)
and sequencing decisions. Next, the scheduler provides the production manager with

the schedule for each resource. Feedback from the manager may result in schedule
modification. The final schedule is then provided to the operators and to the visual
inspectors on paper and on their computer works tations. Rescheduling can be
performed off-line by the scheduler or the manager. and the new schcduk is then
provided to the operators.
The Dispatcher starts by downloa ding the current Wl P data Ilk and deleting all
the unnecessary information. Since the device identification number (DIN) contains
most of the info rmation pertaining to the lot processing requirements. the DIN is
then p<Jrsed to its components. Based on the DIN and other lot attributes. th~ lots
are sorted. Some lots a re sent to the 'Non-Dispatched' page. The se lots may ha\·c
quality problems, require special processing, or should he kept in inventory until a
customer order dictates their processing characteristics (sec Brown cr a/. 2000). \1 ost
lots are sent to the 'Main' p age to be dispatched.
ln the "Main' page the attributes of each lot arc used to dctcrmin~ the n.:maining
processing steps required. A look-up table is u sed to determ ine the pr~fcm.:d
equipment type for the lot at each process step, and con!->eq uently the estimated
processing duration of the lot. Lot ch angeover time is then calculated, as wdl as the
lot's critical ratio (CR) , as follows:
CR = (Due date- Present time)
R emaining processing time·
Based on the C R, lots a rc placed in one of five critical ratio groups (CRGs}:
CRG 1 for lots \vith CR < 0 (already tardy);
CRG2 for lots with 0 =< CR < 1 (will become tardy} :
CRG3 for lots with 1 =< CR < 2 (.l.
t·
d.
• no tmme - tately processed
CRG4 for lots with 2 = < CR < 4 (medium urgency};

· become tard v):
.
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As an Excel program, The Dispatcher accomodates various sorting algorithms.
Therefore, switch!ng the system from sorting based on one performance measures to
another is simple;
During the -~evelopment of The Dispatcher much emphasis \vas placed on the
accuracy of pro.ce·ss modeling. Clearly, the system designers wished to ereate a model
of the test-floc~ that would perfectly imitate the real test-floor. 1\ccdlcss to say,
mainly due to,incompleteness of information and instability of the test-floor and its
operating procedures, designing a complete model capturing every nuance
that affects scheduling decisions is an impossible task. The trade-off between
model accuracy and programming effort was considered numerous times during
the design, and inclusion/exclusion decisions were made frequently. For example,
lots of devices that require rework are rare, and cannot be easily distinguished
from lots of new devices. The programming effort required to obtain the
information needed for this distinction from the manufacturing execution system
database was substantial. Rework processing time is typically slightly shorter
than the processing time of a new lot. Therefore, it was decided that the slight
difference in duration and the rarity of rework lots did not justify the extra
programming effort.
It was relatively simple to guarantee the accuracy of the data retrieved from the
manufacturing'~~ecution system database. It was more complicated to maintain the
accuracy of data in the internal lookup tables. Engineering developments frequently
result in new· d~vices, as well as reduction of processing and changeover times.
Modifications '~f The Dispatcher lookup tables must be coded with every such
change. Therefore, procedures that guaranteed transfer of such information from the
engineering department to the manufacturing department were put in place.
To insure update, the maintainer of the dispatcher was added to the signature list
for approved design changes. This table modification is done within the budgeted
one day per week of maintenance.
The simplicity of The Dispatcher keeps its run time shorter than five minutes.
The scheduler.. fypically prepares a daily schedule in about an hour. Rescheduling
is typically performed once or twice daily, and would typically be completed
in 30 minutes (including the time to enter information about, e.g. machine
breakdowns, etc.).
__ ,

10. Conclusions
,..\

..

The Dispatchei'was still in use four years after its implementation. By then, several
vendor produ~ts evaluated as an alternative to The Dispatcher were no longer
available. A schedule for the test-floor was created daily using the system,
production supervisers used the system to reschedule in the event of machine
?reakdown, and test-floor operators used The Dispatcher routinely to. obtain
Information pertaining to their schedule and to the urgency of the opcratwns for
which they were responsible. The performance improvements due to The Dispatcher
are summarised in table 3.
The Dispat~her was only a small-sc~le ~uccess story at _Xilinx. ~m~ll-scale,
because it required a relatively small capital mvestment, and 1ts contnbutwn was
limited to improving the San-Jose test-floor performance. Xilinx subcontracts

Table 3.

Performance .tmprovemen t d ue to new ·schedulinl!~ system .

Oircct and tangible
On-time-delivery increased

from 70% to 90%
Lot lead time reduced by 30%

Organisational
Understanding of capacity issues led to.
development of better capacity planmng.
svstcm
.
.
Better relationships and cummumcatton
among operations, planning. and shop-floor
Acquired process knowl~d~~ l~J to scn:ral
process improvement lllltlattvcs
.
Easier, tnore effective management ol the
production floor

the majority of its testing to vendors who use their own scheduling methods.
The obvious contribution of The Dispatcher was , therefore. local. On-time
delivery of the San-Jose facility increased from 70% to 90'X~ o.n avcr<~ge. and
Jot lca.d-Limcs decreased by approximately 30°/ o. Time and sktll rcq utrcm~nts
to create a daily schedule for the test-floor were reduced significantly. as ddatlcd
above.
Other contributions of The Dispatcher were perhaps more significant. although
intangible. Through the use of The Dispatcher, the extent of the company's
overloading policies and their consequences were better understood. The company
was then able to usc the process data collected for the design of The Dispatcher to
develop a capacity analysis system of the entire cotnpany's manufacturing
operations. In addition to the dissemination of process expertise dcscrihcd above
better relationships were formed between various groups who relied on hcttcr data to
reach operational decisions. For example, disputes as to the cause of throughput
problems could be discussed between the operations and planning group , referring to
the hard data of what had been scheduled, and how the schedule had been modified.
(Similar results may have been obtained with a vendor provided solution, we are
merely pointing out that the result did not require a vt:ndor provided solution.)
Better relationships were also established between the system's developers ami its
users. These rehttionships later led to several successful process-improvement
initiatives. In summary , the in-house development effort and the associated
analysis, provided critical learning, knowledge and relationship-building for the
re-engineering of the process.
This article, in addition to reporting on the contributions made by The
Dispatcher at Xilinx, has also added to the literature on make-or-buy decisions ror
manufacturing soft.ware, by providing what we hope is a compelling example of i:l
?rm ~hat ~as u~ed m-hou sc development as a core capability. Clearly each situation
IS .~mque m th1 s :egard, and we have already noted many of the unique factors at
~tim~ that c~ntnbu~ed to our decision to develop an in-house system. A complete
hst of _these factors 1s presented in table 4. However, we think our framework ~111d
analysts of the pro?lem may .be useful for other corporations facing similar deci sion s.
or researchers trymg to bmld a more generic framework. While some thcoreticHl

Table 4.

Factors contributing to success of new scheduling system.

Scheduling specific
In-house availability of .
scheduling expertise ·
Availability of program.ining
expertise
Availability of process.
expertise

Organisational
Atmosphere supporting in-house

developments
Open-architecture of information system
allowing integration of systems developed

in-house
Low employee turnover leading to stability
of design and maintenance expertise
Good relationship between system design
team and system users
Top management support
Lmv on-time-delivery performance crisis:
reduces barriers to change
Perceptton of greater flexibility: that an
in-house system would be more
accommodating of modifications

work has appeared -~~cently (e.g. Downing et al. 2003) there is clearly a great deal of
work remaining. We think our paper helps in the development of a more general
understanding of ~ake-or-buy issues for manufacturing software.
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